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Abstract and Keywords
This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments 
against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the 
pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown 
that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but 
logically validmodus tollensarguments. After specifying the question relevant to 
underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of 
competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed 
by science itself. With the content and structure of the two nonrealist arguments clarified, 
novel relations between them are uncovered, revealing the severity of their collective 
threat against epistemic realism and its “no-miracles” argument. The final section 
proposes, however, that the realist’s axiological tenet “science seeks truth” is not 
blocked. An attempt is made to indicate the promise for a nonepistemic, purely 
axiological scientific realism—here dubbed “Socratic scientific realism.”
Keywords: scientific realism, pessimistic meta-induction, underdetermination, empirical equivalence, no-miracles 
argument, modus tollens, axiological scientific realism
1 Introduction
CONTEMPORARY scientific realism embraces two core tenets, one axiological and the other 
epistemological. According to the axiological tenet, the primary aim of science is truth—
truth, for the realists, being no less attributable to assertions about unobservables than 
assertions about observables. According to the epistemological tenet, we are justified in 
believing an “overarching empirical hypothesis,” a testable meta-hypothesis, about 
scientific theories. For standard scientific realism, that meta-hypothesis is that our 
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successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. The justification for believing this 
meta-hypothesis resides in the “no-miracles argument”: were our successful scientific 
theories not at least approximately true, their success would be a miracle. In other words, 
rejecting miracles as explanatory, the (approximate) truth of our theories is the only, and 
so the best, explanation of their success. Because both sides of the debate have taken the 
axiological tenet to stand or fall with the epistemological tenet, it is the debate over the 
epistemological tenet that is at the forefront of the literature. Accordingly, this article is 
concerned primarily with epistemic scientific realism, in particular, clarifying and 
reinforcing the two primary nonrealist objections against it. Only briefly, at the end, do I 
return to the axiological tenet.
2 The Historical Argument Against Scientific 
Realism
There are two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism. In the next section, 
I address the argument from the underdetermination of theories by data. Here I 
discuss the historical argument against scientific realism,  which takes seriously the 
assertion that the scientific realist’s meta-hypothesis is empirically testable. At its core 
lies a list of successful theories that cannot, by present lights, be construed as (even 
approximately) true. Contemporary versions have generally drawn on Larry Laudan’s 
(1981) well-known list of such theories (e.g., theories positing phlogiston, caloric, the 
luminiferous ether, etc.). The most prevalent version of this argument is known as “the 
pessimistic meta-induction”: because many past successful theories have turned out to be 
false, we can inductively infer that our present-day theories are likely false. Accordingly, 
realists respond that there are insufficiently many positive instances to warrant the 
conclusion: referencing Laudan’s historical argument, Stathis Psillos writes, “This kind of 
argument can be challenged by observing that the inductive basis is not big and 
representative enough to warrant the pessimistic conclusion” (1999: 105). Here I discuss 
two alternative noninductive variants of the historical argument, both of which take the 
form of a modus tollens: the first I articulated earlier (Lyons 2002), and the second I 
introduce here.
2.1 The First Meta–Modus Tollens
As with the standard pessimistic induction, the core premise of the noninductive 
historical modus tollens is a list of successful theories that are not, by present lights, 
approximately true. In this historical argument, the list of false successful theories 
demonstrates not that our contemporary theories are (likely) false but that the realist 
meta-hypothesis is false, in which case we cannot justifiably believe it. In fact, I contend 
(Lyons 2001, 2002) that this is how we should understand the structure of the historical 
argument in Laudan (1981). (However, notably, in texts published both before [1977: 126] 
(p. 565) 
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and after [1983: 123] “A Confutation of Convergent Realism” [1981], Laudan explicitly 
embraces the standard pessimistic meta-induction.) As we have seen, in its standard form 
the empirical meta-hypothesis the realist says we can justifiably believe is “our successful 
theories are approximately true.” And the standard argument for that thesis is that it 
would be a miracle were our theories to be as successful as they are, were they not at 
least approximately true. The choice this realist gives us is between approximate truth 
and miracles, the latter being no genuine option at all. The historical threat, then, briefly 
stated yet properly construed, is as follows
1. If (a) that realist meta-hypothesis were true, then (b) we would have no successful
theories that cannot be approximately true. (If we did, each would be a “miracle,”
which no one of us accepts.)
2. However, (not-b) we do have successful theories that cannot be approximately
true: the list (of “miracles”).
3. Therefore, (not-a) the realist meta-hypothesis is false. (And the no-
miracles argument put forward to justify that meta-hypothesis is unacceptable.)
As mentioned, the historical premise has been traditionally understood to provide positive 
instances toward a nonrealist conclusion that our successful scientific theories are (likely) 
false. However, we now see that premise as providing counterinstances to the realist 
meta-hypothesis that our successful theories are approximately true. We are making no 
meta-induction toward an affirmation that our scientific theories are (likely) false but 
rather a meta–modus tollens that reveals the falsity of the realist meta-hypothesis (and 
the unacceptability of the no-miracles argument). Not only, then, are we not justified in 
believing the realist’s meta-hypothesis; that hypothesis cannot even be accepted as a 
“fallible” or “defeasible”—let alone a “likely”—conjecture. It is simply false. One virtue 
attributable to this variant of the historical argument is that it no longer hinges on the 
quantitative strength of an inductive basis, and efforts to weaken that basis will not 
eliminate the threat. Notice also, for instance, that the modus tollens requires no 
commitment as to which specific scientific theories among the mutually contradictory 
successful theories are the false ones—the falsity may lie in the past theories, in the 
contemporary theories that directly contradict them, or both. On this view, the quest to 
empirically increase the quantity of instances is not to provide strength for an inductive 
inference. It is rather to secure the soundness of the modus tollens, to secure the truth of 
the pivotal second premise, the claim that there are counterinstances to the realist meta-
hypothesis. Put another way, increasing counterinstances serves to strengthen and secure 
the nonampliative, nonuniversal falsifying hypothesis “some successful theories are 
false.” An additional role served by increasing the counterinstances (implicit in the 
previous parenthetical notes) pertains to the very argument realists invoke to justify 
believing their meta-hypothesis: the greater the quantity of “miracles,” the more obvious 
it becomes that the core claim of the no-miracles argument is false. Increasing the 
collection of what become for the realist inexplicable successes, we are forced to reject 
the realist claim to offer the only, or even merely the best, explanation of those 
successes.  Moreover, for each counterinstance, it is now the realist who fails to live up to 
the realist’s own much-touted demand for explanation. (Later we will see that increasing 
(p. 566) 
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the historical counterinstances serves another, still noninductive purpose, in a second
modus tollens.) Most crucially, this construal of the historical argument renders impotent 
numerous defenses against it. (Notably, among plenty of others, Lange [2002], Kitcher 
[2001], Magnus and Callender [2004], Parsons [2005], and Stanford [2006: 10–11]  offer 
other recent arguments against the inductive variant of the historical argument, each of 
which misses the mark against this meta–modus tollens.)
One, albeit awkward, response to this modus tollens is to deny my claim that the 
realist invokes a meta-hypothesis. In fact, surprisingly, on both sides of the contemporary 
realism debate realism is construed as claiming we can justifiably believe the best 
explanation of natural phenomena. However prevalent this construal may be, it is the 
result of confusion regarding both the phenomena that realism explains and what it is 
that explains those phenomena. With the modus tollens now in hand, we can make clear 
just how untenable realism is rendered by this misconstrual. Of course the phenomena 
calling for explanation are not those of the natural world, so to speak; the latter are what 
scientific theories purport to explain. What realism purports to explain is, rather, a 
property of scientific theories. Nor, of course, is that which does the explaining itself a 
scientific theory; what the latter explains are natural phenomena. Just as that which is 
explained by realism is a property of scientific theories, so is that which does the 
explaining: one property of scientific theories explains another.
With regard to the property to be explained: in order to justify belief that bears on the 
content of science, realists must appeal to a property of scientific theories, which, in 
some epistemically relevant way, distinguishes those theories from any other arbitrarily 
selected collection of statements—say, collections of possible statements about the 
observable and unobservable that are contrary to what is accepted by contemporary 
science. And here one might think, yes, that property can simply be that of being the best 
explanation for a given set of phenomena. However, first the explanation needs to be 
“good enough” (Lipton, 2004); that is, it needs to meet the criteria scientists employ for 
acceptance. Second, even if scientists employ strict criteria, realists cannot simply map 
their beliefs onto scientific acceptance. Since to believe P is to believe that P is true, to 
believe the accepted explanation for a set of phenomena is to believe that it is true. Thus 
we have already landed on a meta-hypothesis “accepted theories are true.” Moreover, 
with the proper understanding of the historical argument, we realize that this meta-
hypothesis is unequivocally refuted by the meta–modus tollens, at nearly every turn in the 
history of science. Success, then, cannot be equated with superiority over available 
competitors, even when that superiority is determined by strict criteria for scientific 
acceptance. The property that realism purports to explain must go even beyond those 
criteria: it must be a surprising property—for instance, predictive success—such that, 
without some other property (e.g., truth), it would be a miracle were the theory to have it.
Regarding the property that does the explaining: the modus tollens forces us to see that it 
cannot simply be the truth of the theory. Not only is “accepted theories are true” refuted 
at nearly every historical turn; it turns out there are numerous counterinstances to even 
“theories achieving novel predictive success are true.” Although Laudan was not 
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concerned with novelty when formulating his list, numerous novel successes are listed in
Lyons (2002, 70–72): there I show that, along with false theories outside of Laudan’s list, 
those theories positing phlogiston, caloric, ether, and so on did achieve novel predictive 
success. In fact, even if the realist could somehow justify a commitment to only our most 
successful contemporary theories, the latter theories are not such that they can be 
believed outright: despite their individual successes, general relativity and quantum
field theory, for instance, contradict one another; they cannot both be, strictly 
speaking, true—at best, at least one is only approximately so. So realists are forced to 
invoke as the explanatory property not truth per se but something along the lines of
approximate truth. A meta-hypothesis is required and—despite a desire for a “face-value” 
realism, wherein we simply believe our favorite theories—that meta-hypothesis must be 
something similar to “predictively successful theories are (at least approximately) true.”
Because it is only contemporary theories about which most realists want to be realists, 
and because our realist inclinations may blind us to the relevance of the conflict between 
general relativity and quantum field theory, we are prompted here to bolster the point 
that there is a conflict. I submit that the clash between those theories is taken as a given 
and in fact is taken to be the driving problem in contemporary theoretical science, by any 
number of physicists—including those in as much disagreement as, on one hand, Brian 
Greene and Leonard Susskind, who advocate string theory, and, on the other, Lee Smolin 
and Peter Woit, who argue against it.  Additionally, profoundly relevant but generally 
overlooked in philosophical circles is the dramatic conflict arising from the conjunction of 
those otherwise successful theories and the data regarding the acceleration of the 
universal expansion, the value of . In short, that conjunction results in what may well be 
the greatest clash between prediction and data in the history of science: the predicted 
value for  is inconceivably greater than what the data permit, off by “some 120 orders-of-
magnitude!” (Frieman et al. 2008: 20), letting physicists speak for themselves. This 
“blatant contradiction with observations … indicates a profound discrepancy”—“between 
General Relativity (GR) and Quantum Field Theory (QFT)—a major problem for 
theoretical physics” (Ellis et al. 2011: 1). Predicting, for instance, that “there would be no 
solar system” (2), this “profound contradiction” amounts to a “major crisis for theoretical 
physics” (10). (See also Murugan et al. 2012: 2–3.) Now contrast this “major crisis”—
along with, perhaps, the galactic discrepancies that have prompted the positing of dark 
matter—against the comparatively negligible discrepancies that ultimately led to the 
overthrow of Newtonian physics by general relativity: the mildly aberrant behavior of 
Mercury, the less than determinate results (as it now turns out) of the Eddington 
expedition…. Again, the primary point is that, given the relation between general 
relativity and quantum field theory, at least one of these otherwise predictively successful 
theories cannot be strictly speaking true; at best at least one is only approximately true. 
Since believing that T is approximately true is to believe that T is strictly speaking false, 
believing that T is approximately true is altogether distinct from simply believing T. We 
must wholly discard the thesis that realists simply believe the best explanation of 
phenomena, along with any lip service to face-value realism. Recognizing the untenability 
of these notions, it is clear that our realist cannot avoid a meta-hypothesis. And, with the
(p. 568) 
4
Scientific Realism
Page 6 of 25
modus tollens in hand, we see that this meta-hypothesis must be one that invokes as its 
explanatory correlate something along the lines of approximate truth and, as the 
correlate to be explained, a property more restrictive than scientific acceptability,
for instance, predictive success—hereafter meaning “novel success,” where the 
data predicted were not used in developing the theory.
(p. 569) 
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2.2 The Second Meta–Modus Tollens
We can now introduce a second, new historical meta–modus tollens. This variant 
embraces lessons from the underdetermination argument, discussed later, and from the 
insight provided by twentieth-century philosophy of science that evaluations of empirical 
theories are comparative. Here, however, what are to be compared are meta-hypotheses. 
Claiming that we are justified in believing the meta-hypothesis “predictively successful 
theories are approximately true,” the scientific realist is committed to claiming 
justification for believing that meta-hypothesis and the no-miracles premise over those 
ampliative meta-hypotheses that oppose them. By the latter, I mean to include the 
following “ContraSR” meta-hypotheses:
• “predictively successful theories are statistically unlikely to be approximately true”
• “predictively successful theories are not-even-approximately-true.”
Asking whether we are justified in believing the realist’s meta-hypothesis and no miracles 
premise over ContraSRs, we must ask: Which are in better accord with the data? In line 
with what we have seen so far, if any data could stand as correlatively precise positive 
instances for a ContraSR, they would have to be successful theories that are not
approximately true. That given, and given the list of predictively successful theories that 
are not approximately true, the ContraSRs must be credited with such positive instances 
(which, as noted later, need not be literally “confirming” instances). And, in the historical 
argument, these positive instances are identified empirically, wholly independent of any 
presupposition that such a ContraSR is true. Moreover, without granting victory in
advance to the realist’s hypothesis, we have no data that stand as correlatively 
precise negative instances of a ContraSR. By contrast, the realist’s meta-hypothesis has 
no correlatively precise positive instances without already establishing it. And it has a set 
of correlatively precise negative instances, the list, again without requiring any 
presupposition of a ContraSR. Given the list of successful theories that are not 
approximately true, the ContraSRs are rendered in their relation to the data superior to 
the realist hypothesis, and we are not justified in believing the latter over these 
ContraSRs. We are not, therefore, justified in believing the scientific realist’s meta-
hypothesis.
One reason I have included two nonidentical meta-hypotheses as ContraSRs is to 
emphasize that none of this has anything to do with believing one or the other of the two. 
And here we must not mislead ourselves to think that there is anything intrinsically 
ampliative in the relevant notions of “superiority” and “relation to the data.” Even if most 
swans are white and only a few are black, it is unproblematic to say that black swans 
stand as correlatively precise positive (but not literally “confirming”) instances of the 
false hypothesis “all swans are black”; and this unproblematic assertion requires no 
induction back to that false hypothesis. Likewise with the ContraSRs (irrespective of 
whether they are true or false): it is unproblematic to say that predictively successful 
theories that are not approximately true stand as correlatively precise positive (but not 
(p. 570) 
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literally “confirming”) instances of the meta-hypothesis “predictively successful theories 
are statistically unlikely to be approximately true” or “predictively successful theories are 
not-even-approximately-true.” This unproblematic assertion also requires no ampliative 
inference back to either of these ContraSRs. No induction is involved in the task of 
tallying correlatively precise positive/negative instances (which are not, in themselves, 
literally confirming or refuting) or the task of comparing hypotheses in light of those 
results. Whether the same can be said for the act of choosing between the meta-
hypotheses is a distinct question and not at issue here: for the recognition of the 
superiority of ContraSRs in respect to the data over the realist’s meta-hypothesis does 
nothing in itself to necessitate, in turn, an inference to the truth of, a belief in, or even the 
tentative choosing or acceptance of any such empirically ampliative meta-hypothesis 
about successful theories. Nonetheless, employing the data, we find that we are not 
justified in believing the realist’s meta-hypothesis. In fact, the argument just presented 
can be expressed as follows:
1. (a) We are justified in believing the realist meta-hypothesis (given the evidence)
only if (b) we do not have greater evidence for those that oppose it (ContraSRs).
2. However, (not-b) we do have greater evidence for those that oppose it (for
ContraSRs): the list; (and as above, this claim involves no induction to any
ContraSR).
3. Therefore, (not-a) it is not the case that we are justified in believing the realist’s
meta-hypothesis (given the evidence).
This is another modus tollens, related to but distinct from the original introduced 
previously. There we saw that increasing the evidence against the realist meta-hypothesis
secures soundness, the second premise of the first modus tollens. We now see a 
further reason for increasing the evidence and strengthening that premise. Via ContraSR 
meta-hypotheses, increasing the quantity of the items on the list increases the 
counterevidential weight against the realist meta-hypothesis—again necessitating no 
inductive (or other kind of) inference to a conclusion that our contemporary successful 
scientific theories are statistically unlikely to be approximately true or that they are not-
even-approximately true, and so on.
To close this section on the historical argument, let us say, for the moment, that in 
response to the second premise of the first modus tollens, the realist chooses to embrace 
the following as the meta-hypothesis we can justifiably believe: “predictively successful 
theories are statistically likely to be approximately true.” Not only would a retreat to this 
statistical meta-hypothesis diminish (but not eliminate) the testability of the realist meta-
hypothesis; it would also wholly concede to miracles and to a failure on the part of the 
realist to explain successful theories. More to the point, the first ContraSR, “predictively 
successful theories are statistically unlikely to be approximately true,” is bolder than but 
entails the negation of this new realist statistical hypothesis; that given, realists would 
find themselves in exactly the same situation as with their original meta-hypothesis: we 
have greater evidence for a bolder hypothesis that entails its negation. Hence, such a 
(p. 571) 
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weakening of the realist hypothesis makes no difference in light of this new, second
modus tollens.
3 The Argument from the Underdetermination 
of Theories by Data
3.1 The Competitor Thesis
Beyond the historical argument, the other central challenge to realism is the argument 
from the underdetermination of theories by data.  Its core premise is a competitor
thesis. In basic terms: our successful theories have empirically equivalent, yet 
incompatible, competitors. From that, the conclusion of the underdetermination 
argument is drawn. In basic terms: despite their empirical success, we cannot justifiably 
believe that our favored theories, rather than their competitors, are (approximately) true. 
I argued earlier that, contrary to much of the literature, the historical argument is not 
properly construed as inductive; I suggest that, likewise, the argument from 
underdetermination calls for clarification.
The first step is to isolate that question regarding competitors that is genuinely at issue 
in the scientific realism debate. That question is not “Which theories can we justifiably 
believe?” or, even more carefully, “Which theories are those among the class of theories 
such that we can justifiably believe that they are approximately true?” Since answers to 
these questions concede that there are such theories, the questions themselves grant a 
victory to realism in advance of being answered. Toward the identification of the proper 
question, we are prompted to clarify our terminology. Although our theories may have 
many alternatives (including alternative formulations), we can take “distinct alternatives” 
to denote alternatives such that, if those alternatives are approximately true, our favored 
theories cannot be approximately true: were the alternatives approximately true, they 
would render our preferred theories patently false. Realism, claiming we can justifiably 
believe the meta-hypothesis “our successful theories are approximately true” requires 
that we can justifiably deny the approximate truth of any such distinct alternatives to our 
favored theories. Taking “competitors” to mean distinct alternatives that are empirically 
on par with our favored theories, we see that the relevant and legitimate question in the 
realism debate is whether our successful scientific theories have competitors such that we 
cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true.
With the proper competitor question in hand, the second step is to recognize that the 
realist cannot answer the argument from underdetermination merely by denying that our 
favored theories have empirically equivalent competitors. In fact, nonrealists other than, 
say, Bas van Fraassen, such as Laudan (1981), Sklar (1981), and Stanford (2006), 
recognize that, at least historically, the most genuine threats to scientific realism are 
6
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empirically distinct. Just as theories that are empirically distinct from our contemporary 
theories occupy the core premise of the historical argument, such theories can occupy 
the competitor premise of the underdetermination argument. Clarifying “empirically on 
par” to allow for this, we can finalize our previous definition of “competitors”: 
competitors are distinct alternatives whose empirical predictions accord with the 
observed data predicted by our favored theories. Since it is so commonly assumed that 
realism is threatened only by underdetermination arguments that invoke empirically 
equivalent competitors, we are prompted to go beyond Laudan, Sklar, and Stanford and 
make clear just why such an assumption arises and why it is false.
It arises because, in contrast with an empirically distinct competitor, a competitor that is 
empirically equivalent to our favored theory is empirically ineliminable: no matter how 
many empirical predictions are tested, there is no point in the future at which such a 
competitor can be empirically eliminated; and, given the fact of empirical ineliminability, 
our favored scientific theories face temporally unrestricted underdetermination. 
Empirical equivalence suffices for empirical ineliminability, which in turn suffices for 
temporally unrestricted underdetermination. It is for this reason, I suggest, that the 
literature is replete with concern about empirical equivalence. Nonetheless, I contend 
that, as long as we find the right set of empirically distinct theories, that demand is 
irrelevant. That is, although empirical equivalence is sufficient for empirical 
ineliminability and so temporally unrestricted underdetermination, it is not a necessary 
condition for either.
First, an obvious point, whose importance is unencumbered by its obviousness: until 
distinguishing tests have been performed, the empirical distinguishability of competitors 
does nothing whatsoever to license belief in the (approximate) truth of our favored 
theories. Because realism is, in every instance, about belief (in approximate truth) at time
t, potential future tests of competitors (at t-plus-a-century or even t-plus-a-decade) offer 
no positive evidence in favor of our preferred theories over those competitors. This fact 
alone strikes at the claim that we can be justified in believing (in the approximate truth 
of) our favored theories—empirically distinct competitors, which are not yet eliminated, 
posing no less a threat than empirically equivalent competitors. Second, if the situation is 
such that our theories will always have indefinitely many competitors, the distinguishing 
tests can never be performed for the entire set: in that case, our favored scientific 
theories are and will always be faced with empirically ineliminable competitors. Even if 
each competitor is individually empirically distinct from a given favored theory, and thus 
in principle individually empirically eliminable, the underdetermination that results from 
indefinitely many such competitors remains temporally unrestricted. The epistemic threat 
is no less severe than that posed by empirically equivalent competitors. With these points, 
I suggest that, just as the pessimistic induction is a straw objection to, so a distraction in 
favor of, scientific realism, so too are irrelevant competitor questions and the superfluous 
demand for empirical equivalence.
(p. 573) 
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We can now endeavor to identify classes of genuine competitors and so secure the 
relevant competitor thesis. Toward that end, it is notable that, although the historical and 
underdetermination arguments have generally been treated as distinct, important 
relations hold between them.  Here I develop an empirically and historically informed 
competitor thesis and thus a foundational premise for an argument from 
underdetermination. However, I endeavor to avoid any inductive inference. The general 
strategy I offer for doing so is as follows: we empirically identify historically exemplified 
competitor relations between past and present theories, and, in particular, we isolate 
those competitor relations that extend to any theory related to phenomena in the way 
that scientific theories are noncontentiously required to be related to phenomena—
according to both realists and antirealists. From among the latter subset of 
competitor relations, we identify those that can be instantiated in indefinitely many ways. 
In what follows, I specify two such competitor relations, demonstrating along the way 
that we have a historically informed yet wholly noninductive way to realize that any 
theories we may favor have indefinitely many competitors.
3.2 Competitors, Set 1
Toward the empirical identification of one such competitor relation between past and 
present theories, we can look first to those theories on “the list” employed in the 
historical argument. We can select as T such a historically successful but now rejected 
theory. According to contemporary science, T (approximately) predicts that a certain set 
of observed phenomena obtains. However, again according to contemporary science, in 
certain situations, the phenomena behave in a manner that significantly diverges from T’s 
predictions. Here it is crucial to recognize that, since we are employing contemporary 
science to articulate the details of the divergence and since “scientific seriousness” is 
relevant to the realism debate (and its proper competitor question) only insofar as it 
pertains to whether or not a theory could be approximately true, the competitors we are 
considering cannot be excluded on the grounds that they are, for instance, “Cartesian 
fantasies.” Contemporary science itself reveals a competitor (CT), which, though 
contradicting T, shares those predictions successfully made by T. The following is 
expressed by CT:
The phenomena are (approximately) as T predicts, except in situations S, in which 
case the phenomena behave in manner M.
Instantiating this expression as a relation that obtains between past and present 
successful theories, one can insert for T, say, Kepler’s deep theory of the anima motrix, 
which includes the following posits, each of which is patently false by contemporary 
lights: the sun is a divine being at the center of the universe; the natural state of the 
planets is rest; there is a nonattractive emanation, the anima motrix, coming from the sun 
that pushes the planets forward in their paths; the planets have an inclination to be at 
rest and to thereby resist the solar push, and this contributes to their slowing speed when 
more distant from the sun; the force that pushes the planets is a “directive” magnetic 
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force, and so on. One can include for S occasions in which, say, Jupiter approaches 
Saturn, and occasions in which a planet’s orbit is particularly close to the sun, and so on, 
adding as M, say, “non-Keplerian perturbations” and “the advancement of Mercury’s 
perihelion.” Using contemporary science to articulate S and M in their full particulars, 
these will be awkward and utterly nonsimple assertions, and the realist will be tempted to 
claim that such a competitor (in this case, a competitor to Kepler’s theory) lacks certain 
explanatory virtues. However, because this competitor is an expression of successful 
contemporary science and because the realist cannot sacrifice the possibility of taking 
successful theories of contemporary science to be approximately true, the realist 
must concede that the absence of such virtues does nothing to provide grounds for 
denying the approximate truth of such a competitor. We see, then, that this expression 
reveals that there are rivals for the truth of such past theories. However, that expression 
also reveals that there are such rivals to any contemporary theory that accounts for some 
set of phenomena. Instantiating T with any accepted contemporary theory, the remaining 
clauses can include any S that has not (yet) been acknowledged as obtaining and any M 
that significantly differs from the behavior that T describes. We can add the fact that, 
according to science itself, the data set we have is infinitesimally small compared to the 
totality of events in the 13.8-billion-year-old universe. These points noted, we recognize 
that there are indefinitely many options and combinations, all of which will share T’s 
predictions about observed phenomena. Although a very small sample of these 
competitors may be subject to future empirical elimination, indefinitely many such 
competitors will remain at any time.
3.3 Competitors, Set 2
Inspired by such historical considerations, we can move forward to identify another set of 
competitor relations and so another set of competitors. To similarly ensure that the next 
competitor set is empirically informed by science itself, we recognize first that, from 
science itself, including both past and present science, one can extract the assertion of 
situations in nature such that they
(a) appear in some experiential context, or were even taken at some stage in the
history of science, to exemplify invariable and foundational continuities of the
natural world, but
(b) are deemed by (e.g., later or contemporary) science to be no more than the
residual effects of, and contingent on, what are ultimately uncommon conditions.
After noting a few cases in which this situation is exemplified, I unpack the way in which 
the prevalence in contemporary science of such posited special conditions reveals an 
additional set of competitors to the theories of contemporary science itself. In what 
follows, I use “ ” to mean “an invariable and foundational continuity of the natural 
world.” From the Newtonian picture, the posit that the sidereal period of a celestial 
object is proportional to the radius cubed constitutes no  but instead captures a 
consequence of the special condition of the low mass of the planets in our solar system in 
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relation to that of the sun. Likewise from the Newtonian picture, no  is captured by the 
posit that the rate of acceleration for all objects falling toward earth is 9.8 meters per 
second per second: on one hand, this posit neglects the possibility of a terminal velocity; 
on the other, for instance, conjoining it to Newton’s posit that the moon is in freefall, 
entails a sudden and extraordinary collision between the earth and moon. Consider as 
well, say, the assertion that the fluids argon, H 0, and freon R-113, come to a “rolling” 
boil at 185.85˚, 100˚, and 47.6˚, respectively. By contemporary lights, rather than 
capturing intrinsic and invariable properties of argon, H 0, and freon R-113, this claim 
describes mere by-products of special conditions—for example, terrestrial convection 
currents acting on the molecules in the fluid, the currents themselves the result of the 
earth’s mass, the proximity of the fluid to the earth’s center of mass, and so on. (In fact, 
in microgravity experiments aboard the space shuttle, freon R-113 has been observed to 
boil at a lower temperature and to result not in a “rolling” boil but rather a single bubble 
coalescing in the middle of the fluid; Merte et al. 1996). That the earth is at rest, that the 
sun passes over us, that iron filings and compass needles are drawn in the direction of 
Polaris, that the sun emits primarily yellow light—in themselves, and by present lights, 
these claims approximate no s but stand only as artifacts of certain conditions: 
respectively, for instance, the nondiscernible nature of minimally accelerating motion, the 
location from which we observe the earth–sun relation, a temporary phase in the cycle of 
geomagnetic reversals, the particular dispersal of photons that results given the oxygen, 
nitrogen, carbon molecules in the atmosphere, and so on.
With each of these posits, it is not that a few exceptional phenomena deny their 
candidacy as s; rather, according to contemporary science, these posits capture only 
what ultimately amount to uncommon situations. Extending well beyond these examples, 
contemporary science insists that there are innumerably many other situations such that, 
though they might appear (or might have once appeared) to exemplify s, they are 
nothing more than the residual consequences of particular conditions. Acknowledging the 
ubiquitous positing of such special situations in contemporary science affords the 
recognition of a second collection of competitors to our favored theories. These 
competitors posit that the observed phenomena predicted by our favored theory, T, and its 
auxiliaries are, themselves, merely the result of unique conditions. Our favored theory’s 
empirical claims constitute the description found in manner M (a description of no  but 
only a special situation), brought about by condition C (the particularly unique condition). 
Competitor:
• obtains.
• allows for the presence and absence of condition C and, in itself, patently
contradicts T.
• Condition C obtains (according to the theory complex within which a description of
is embedded) in spatiotemporal location l, and causes observable entities E at l to
behave (approximately) in manner M, as T claims.
2
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Any number of cosmically rare conditions can be posited for C, whose particular effect is 
to bring about a set of phenomena that are in approximate accord with the confirmed 
predictions of our favored theory. Among them are dimensions intersecting, relations 
between our universe and others in the multiverse, stages in our universe’s expansion, 
perhaps even relations between our galaxy and the Great Attractor, or our solar system 
and a galactic center, and so on. In fact there is one such condition that is available at 
nearly any level of nature: C can simply be a threshold for emergence—met by any 
variable regarding populations/quantities of objects, masses, charges, relations 
between entities, and so on—where the descriptions we favor describe no more than rare 
emergent properties. The properties we attribute to observed phenomena have come 
about only because a particular threshold was reached. And upon either surpassing the 
narrow limits of, or dropping below, that threshold, those properties will no longer 
persist. Specifying such a condition allows for indefinitely many competitors that diverge 
dramatically from and hence patently contradict T, all of which will share T’s predictions 
about observed phenomena: nearly any randomly chosen self-consistent set of 
descriptions can qualify as descriptions of s that are posited in the competitors to 
govern phenomena in the absence of C. Given the possibilities expressed in quantum 
mechanics and cosmology—with particle/wave duality of “entities,” wormholes, Kaluza-
Klein theories, branes, holographic universes, and the like—we have great leeway for 
competitors that strike us psychologically as absurd. From the standpoint of these 
competitors, our favored T’s success is no more than a by-product of condition C; and T 
need not, from the standpoint of these competitors, describe, to any stretch of 
“approximation,” any actual s.
Notice that these competitors explain their predicted observable events that are 
unexpected by our favored theory: in the absence of condition C, a condition perhaps 
deeply embedded in our extraordinarily limited experience of the 13.8-billion-year-old 
universe, the phenomena predicted by our favored T will no longer obtain (and those 
events predicted by  will). Notice also that, just as there is no generally accepted causal 
mechanism for certain unique conditions posited in contemporary science (e.g., vacuum 
fluctuations or, to use an example mentioned earlier, geomagnetic reversals), the realist 
demand for approximate truth cannot require that the competitors specify a causal 
mechanism for condition C. More generally, we cannot justifiably deny the approximate 
truth of these competitors merely because they do not posit causal mechanisms. Nor can 
we justifiably deny their approximate truth on the grounds that they violate a principle of 
the uniformity of nature or that they require that the world be nonsimple. These 
competitors are subject to no such charges.
We have now seen two sets of genuine competitors, alternatives that can render our 
favored theories such that they are not even approximately true and that nonetheless 
enjoy the same success as our favored theories. Taking both sets into account, we need 
concede little more than that some such competitors may be incomplete. However, 
because that particular concession is taken to be applicable to even our best theories, 
general relativity and quantum field theory among them, a charge of incompleteness 
cannot justify a denial of their approximate truth. Of course there are no data available 
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that favor these competitors over our current theories, but nor are there data to eliminate 
them in favor of our preferred theories. And that is what is key. Moreover, in line with 
points made earlier, the nonrealist is no epistemic realist about competitors: 
acknowledging that there are competitors that assert that, say, S, M, and/or C obtain is 
wholly distinct from asserting that S, M, and/or C in fact obtain. And liberating ourselves 
from the pessimistic induction to the falsity of present-day theories, as we have, the 
nonrealist is wholly liberated from any denial of the truth of our favored present theories. 
With this we have two empirically informed, yet noninductively grounded, methods for 
revealing the following competitor thesis, which provides a positive answer to the 
competitor question that is relevant to the scientific realism debate: our favored 
theories have genuine competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are 
approximately true.
4 Taking Stock: The Modi Tollentis Against 
Scientific Realism, Where History and 
Underdetermination Meet
I now consider how our competitor thesis can be put to work in a set of arguments 
against epistemic scientific realism. Note first that, although we arrived at the competitor 
thesis by way of analyzing, for instance, historically exemplified relations between past 
and present theories, because that thesis explicitly pertains to competitors that are not 
past theories, when we consider it only in explicit terms, it is not historical. Closing this 
section, I revisit the two modus tollens arguments we considered earlier. Going beyond 
those arguments for now, our historically grounded but ultimately ahistorical competitor 
thesis allows me to introduce a third—this time ahistorical—modus tollens argument. We 
have seen that epistemic realists claim we can justifiably believe the empirical meta-
hypothesis, “predictively successful theories are approximately true.” As noted earlier, 
taking “distinct alternative” to denote a theory such that, if it is (approximately) true, our 
favored theory cannot be (approximately) true (e.g., as specified earlier, alternatives 
whose posited s are not described by T to any stretch of “approximation”) and taking 
“competitor” to mean a distinct alternative whose empirical predictions accord with the 
observed data predicted by T, it is again clear that epistemic realism requires justification 
for denying that successful theories have any genuine competitors that are 
(approximately) true. We can call this requirement the epistemic realist’s noncompetitor 
condition (see Lyons 2009b). Recognizing that epistemic realism entails this epistemic 
noncompetitor condition, we have the material for a third modus tollens argument against 
realism. Its basic structure is as follows:
1. If (a) epistemic realism holds, then (b) the epistemic realist’s noncompetitor
condition holds.
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2. However, (not-b) the epistemic realist’s noncompetitor condition does not hold.
3. Therefore, (not-a) epistemic realism does not hold.
More carefully,
1. If (a) we can justifiably believe the realist’s meta-hypothesis “our predictively
successful theories are approximately true,” then (b) we can justifiably deny that our
successful theories have approximately true competitors.
2. However, (not-b) we cannot justifiably deny that our predictively successful
theories have approximately true competitors; in fact, on the contrary, given the
previous argument, our predictively successful theories have indefinitely 
many competitors whose approximate truth we cannot justifiably deny.
3. Therefore, (not-a) it is not the case that we can justifiably believe the realist’s
meta-hypothesis “our predictively successful theories are approximately true.”
I have suggested that there are important relations between the historical argument and 
the argument from underdetermination, one example being the empirically/historically 
informed approach we employed toward revealing the two sets of competitors, the latter 
of which substantiate our competitor thesis: our favored theories have indefinitely many 
competitors whose approximate truth we cannot justifiably deny. With the content and 
structure of the arguments against realism now clarified, I add here the bold posit that 
this empirically informed, yet ultimately ahistorical, competitor premise can be conjoined 
to the empirical historical premise (“the list”) in the first and second modus tollens
arguments. That is, recognizing that indefinitely many competitors share the predictive 
success of our favored theories, yet nonetheless patently contradict our favored theories 
(and one another), we must grant that indefinitely many successful theories are patently 
false. The first two modus tollens arguments, no longer limited to being historical, receive 
a drastic increase in the quantity of items on “the list” of counterinstances, giving them a 
vastly stronger, more encompassing core premise. Additionally, given the dramatic rise in 
the quantity of “miracles,” we significantly buttress our earlier conclusion that the no-
miracles justification for believing the realist meta-hypothesis—“it would be a miracle 
were our theories as successful as they are were they not at least approximately true”—is 
utterly false.
Adding the competitors to our counterinstances, it is important to note that they cannot 
be excluded from that list for failing to make novel predictions. A full competitor’s 
predictions are what they are irrespective of when and whether they are actually derived. 
(Consider for instance the frequency and importance of discoveries that an already 
accepted theory entails a given consequence.) Just as the nonarticulated nature of a full 
competitor does nothing to prohibit its approximate truth, it does not affect its 
predictions. Now the sole purpose of the previous two competitor expressions is to reveal 
that there are competitors, and of course those competitors that are never generated 
cannot be excluded for using the data in their generation. Nonetheless, for the sake of 
illustration, consider a computer employing the previous expressions to generate sets of 
competitors to a proposed theory, T. In this case, we have a set of theories, all of which 
(p. 579) 
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contradict one another but make some of the same predictions. And any novel success 
attributable to T is equally attributable to every competitor in the class of those that do 
not diverge in respect to T’s successful novel predictions. These points noted, the 
competitors of concern cannot be excluded from the list of counterinstances for failing to 
make successful novel predictions. I submit that, irrespective of the realist appeal
to novelty, innumerably many competitors genuinely qualify as counterinstances 
to the realist meta-hypothesis.
Finally, this conjunction of an ahistorical competitor thesis to the list of theories in the 
historical argument makes newly salient an important explanatory relation between the 
two primary arguments against epistemic realism: the fact that, historically, we find 
theories that are predictively successful but not even approximately true is wholly 
unsurprising, and even expected, given the fact of underdetermination and, in particular, 
given the fact that every theory has indefinitely many competitors. Now seen in their 
deductive light, I suggest that both the evidence and these arguments against epistemic 
realism are far stronger than both the epistemic realist’s meta-hypothesis and the no-
miracles argument that is meant to provide justification for believing that meta-
hypothesis.
(p. 580) 
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5 Socratic Scientific Realism
Despite such threats to epistemic realism, taking a cue from Nicholas Rescher (1987), I 
argue that the nonrealist is mistaken to discard the realist’s most fundamental tenet: 
science seeks truth. I advocate a wholly nonepistemic, purely axiological scientific realism 
(see Lyons 2001, 2005, 2011, 2012). This nonepistemic realism endeavors to overcome 
our 2,500-year-old obsession with belief  and to treat meta-hypotheses about science, 
including “science seeks truth,” the same way it treats scientific theories—not as objects 
of belief but as tools for inquiry, tools to be deployed in the quest for truth. I take the key 
idea here—discarding belief in the quest for truth—to have a long pedigree. Beyond 
occasionally receiving lip-service as the proper scientific attitude, Rescher, Russell, 
Popper, and Peirce number among those offering comments that accord with it. However, 
I am unsure just who, if anyone, has embraced it as fully as I aspire to.  
Historically tracing back the injunction “seek truth without claiming to possess it,” I 
suppose the figure whose voice we would hear—even if he turned away from the physical 
world—is Socrates. This is one factor leading me toward the name I give my position in 
this article: Socratic scientific realism.
The compulsion to believe may well be what has diverted standard scientific realists from 
refining their empirically uninformative axiological meta-hypothesis, thereby prohibiting 
them from a comprehensive account of science. Specifically, realists, including Rescher, 
have failed to specify just which subclass of true statements science seeks. To at least 
indicate the core idea of my axiological postulate, it is that science seeks to increase the 
XT statements in its theory complexes. XT statements are those whose truth is
experientially concretized—that is, true statements whose truth is made to deductively 
impact, is deductively pushed to and enters into, documented reports of specific 
experiences. This postulate shifts from “truth” to a subclass of true statements, from 
theories to complexes/systems, and from endeavoring to simply attain the truth to 
endeavoring to increase the quantity of true statements in the specified subclass. 
Moreover, explicitly including “increase” in the postulated goal, evaluation is 
unambiguously comparative, theory complex against theory complex. And although 
realist truth is not contingent on the system of statements in which a statement is 
embedded, the experiential concretization of a statement’s truth is. Most significantly, I 
have shown elsewhere (Lyons 2005) that the actual achievement of this state, an increase 
in the XT statements of a theory complex, requires the achievement of a set of syntactic 
theoretical desiderata, the importance of which both sides of the debate agree: namely, 
an increase in empirical accuracy and consistency and an increase in, or at least the 
retention of, breadth of scope, testability, and number of forms of simplicity. I make no 
claim that we can justifiably believe that the posited primary goal has been achieved. 
However, since it cannot be achieved without these otherwise potentially disparate 
theoretical virtues, my axiological meta-hypothesis offers both an explanation and, 
crucially, a justification for their mutual pursuit: if we do not have these necessary 
conditions for our primary goal, an increase in experientially concretized truth, we know 
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we do not have what we seek. Given this relation, I contend, this meta-hypothesis lives up 
to what it demands: for instance, it is informative toward our understanding of “inference 
to the best explanation,” now liberated from epistemic baggage; it provides a better 
account of science than nonrealist axiologies (e.g., Laudan’s meta-hypothesis that science 
seeks problem-solving effectiveness and van Fraassen’s meta-hypothesis that the aim of 
science is empirical adequacy; Lyons, 2005); and finally, and more generally, it 
dramatically improves the realist’s ability to account for what is going on in science. The 
battle cry of Socratic scientific realism is the following: science seeks truth and does so 
rationally, irrespective of whether we can justifiably believe we have achieved it.
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Notes:
( ) See Mill (1859/1998), Laudan (1981), Sklar (1981), Rescher (1987), Worrall (1989),
Leplin (1997), Chakravartty (1998), Psillos (1999), Sankey (2001), Lange (2002), Lyons 
(2002), Kitcher (2001), Chang (2003), Stanford (2003), Magnus and Callender (2004),
Parsons (2005), Lyons (2006), Stanford, (2006), Doppelt (2007), Schurz (2009), Lyons 
(2009a, 2009b), Harker, (2010, 2013), Vickers (2013), Peters (2014).
( ) I discuss nonrealist explanations of success in “Explaining the Success of a Scientific 
Theory” (Lyons 2003).
( ) Stanford offers instead his “new induction.” In short, because past scientists failed to 
think of alternatives, contemporary scientists fail as well.
( ) Ioan Muntean has brought to my attention a formal proof of the clash between 
quantum field theory and general relativity in Weinberg and Witten (1980).
( ) For the sake of simplicity and clarity, here I use this standard realist meta-hypothesis 
as my foil for articulating the form and implications of the primary arguments against 
realism. However, the most sophisticated variant of realism focuses not on theories but 
only those theoretical constituents “responsible for” success (e.g., Psillos 1999). The 
meta-hypothesis becomes “those theoretical constituents that are deployed in the 
derivation of successful novel predictions are at least approximately true.” Testing this 
revision constitutes a research program in itself, taking us well beyond Laudan’s list. 
Although my goal here is not to offer historical case studies, we can note that such a 
program has at least been launched. Invoking the first modus tollens and exploring the 
theoretical constituents genuinely deployed by, for instance, Kepler, Newton, Leverrier, 
and Adams, I detail numerous counterinstances to this sophisticated meta-hypothesis 
(Lyons 2002, 2006), also included in a more recent list offered in Vickers (2013). (See also
Lyons 2013, footnote 13.) It turns out that theories—and in particular “theoretical 
constituents responsible for”—achieving novel successes include the usual suspects, 
those positing phlogiston, caloric, ether, and so on but also less familiar theories such as 
Rankine’s thermodynamic vortex theory, as well as familiar yet overlooked theories, such 
as Kepler’s theory of the anima motrix. Although, here I do not use the deployment 
realist’s far more cumbersome meta-hypothesis as my foil, the points in this article hold 
no less if we pivot our discussion around it.
( ) Encouraged now by the possibility of invoking statistical likelihood, the realist may be 
tempted to move it, so to speak, outside of the meta-hypothesis and claim that we can 
justifiably believe that the meta-hypothesis “predictively successful theories are 
approximately true” is statistically likely. However, this meta-hypothesis has already been 
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rendered false by my first modus tollens; that given, along with the fact that “statistically 
likely” means “statistically likely to be true,” we clearly cannot justifiably believe that this 
meta-hypothesis is statistically likely. It is simply false.
( ) See Mill (1843), Duhem (1914/1991), Quine (1951), Boyd (1973), van Fraassen (1980),
Sklar (1981), Churchland (1985), Ben-Menahem (1990), Horwich (1991), Laudan and 
Leplin (1991), Leplin (1997), Kukla (1998), Psillos (1999), Okasha (2002), Lipton (2004),
Chakravartty (2008), Godfrey-Smith (2008), Wray (2008), Lyons (2009b), Manchak (2009),
Hoyningen-Huene (2011), Worrall (2011), Tulodziecki (2012), Lyons (2013).
( ) Stanford (2006), drawing on Sklar, brings this important point to the fore, offering a 
historical induction to ground what I’ve referred to as a competitor thesis (see footnote 2). 
However—even setting aside the fact that Stanford does not argue for indefinitely many 
competitors in the situations he specifies—I show (Lyons 2013) that his argument poses 
no threat to contemporary realism: it fails to concern itself with the type of theories 
invoked in the realist’s meta-hypothesis (e.g., those making successful novel predictions, 
a problem initially pointed to in Lyons 2006: 544, footnote 10); it rests on a problematic 
thesis regarding the failure of scientists, and it relies on not one but two dubious 
inductions. The arguments I articulate here face none of these problems.
( ) Since, for instance, few of the competitors constitute instances of our theorizing, 
pessimistic inductions that require uniformity in the falsity of our theorizing do not 
inherit this support.
( ) Notably the deployed constituents of concern in footnote 5 also have competitors. 
Cutting to the chase, consider our computer invoking, for instance, the second competitor 
expression as a method for generating competitors. Among the posits genuinely deployed 
toward that end are the following, each of which is patently false by present lights: our 
favored theory, T, is false; only a subclass of T’s observable consequences obtain, and 
(nearly any sized set of specific) observable events outside of that subclass fail to accord, 
and can significantly clash, with observable events described by T;  obtains, as an 
invariable and foundational continuity of the natural world;  allows for the presence and 
absence of condition C; condition C obtains; it obtains in spatiotemporal location l; 
condition C is what allows for the subclass of T’s observable consequences that do obtain, 
and so on. Given indefinitely many possibilities for each of the variables, we have 
indefinitely many competitors even to those constituents that are deployed in the 
derivation of novel successes.
( ) That is, nonsyntactic belief.
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( ) Though Rescher, Russell, and Peirce, for instance, may well advocate epistemic 
humility, they do not follow through on bracketing belief. And as soon as Popper is 
comfortable discussing truth, he introduces the epistemic realist’s thesis that 
corroboration indicates verisimilitude; moreover he at least appears to advocate believing 
the truth of singular empirical predictions. (Additionally, I do not embrace what I take to 
be the other key components of Popperianism, e.g., the denial that science employs 
induction, an obsession with a demarcation criterion and falsifiability, the claim that 
scientists seek to falsify their theories, the demand for content-retention across theory 
change, etc.)
Timothy D. Lyons
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